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Overview 
Since the publication of our last Commentary in January 
2001 the extent of the slowdown in the world economy has 
become a little clearer. There has been a further easing of 
monetary policy in the United States and Japan, although 
interest rates in the Euro zone have yet to be cut. Most 
commentators expect that the US economy will start to 
recover later in the year, though it is extremely unlikely that 
growth will return to the levels experienced over the past 
four years. Prospects for the European Union look more 
positive, partly due to the weakness of the Euro, while there 
must be concern that there are indications that the Japa-
nese economy is faltering. 
It seems unlikely that the global slowdown will result in a 
major recession, although there are some risks attached to 
this relatively benign view. Forecasters often point to the 
difficulties of making accurate projections at turning points 
in the economic cycle and in particular judging how severe 
a downturn will be. On this occasion there are a number of 
additional complicating factors: 
-> There is still considerable uncertainty about the 
financial position of the personal and corporate sectors 
in general and the consequences for aggregate 
demand. The financial imbalances and high levels of 
debt in the US could still lead to severe cut backs in 
spending if equity markets fall further. Recent work by 
the IMF also suggests that, contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom, there is a strong possibility that the 
European economies may be just as vulnerable as the 
US to declines in technology stocks; 
-> The outlook for the US technology sector is particularly 
uncertain. There is a danger that firms in this sector 
may make dramatic adjustments in spending and that 
the knock on effects rapidly spread through the 
international economy; and 
-> Conventional economic theory suggests that the US 
Dollar ought to have weakened in recent months as the 
US economy slowed down and, possibly more impor-
tantly, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates. Instead 
the US Dollar has remained strong and the Euro weak. 
If this pattern continues it will further reduce demand 
in the US and add to the depth of the slowdown. On the 
other had the European economies are currently 
benefiting from a weak Euro and should continue to do 
so. 
Table 1 summarises forecasts for a number of international 
indicators produced by the IMF for their May Economic 
Outlook. At the time of writing these forecasts are among 
the most recent to have been produced by a major interna-
tional economic organisation. 
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Growth rates in the US, Japan and the Euro zone are all 
projected to fal l when compared with the 2 0 0 0 out turns. 
The slowdown in the US is the most dramat ic with 2 0 0 1 
growth projected to be less than a third of the 2 0 0 0 f igure. 
Growth in Japan more than halves, though f rom a lower 
s tar t ing point than the US, while the Euro zone enjoys a 
much milder reduct ion in forecast growth. Longer-term 
prospects are more benign in the sense tha t growth is 
projected to rise again in 2 0 0 2 in all three blocs, a l though 
not to the levels seen in 2 0 0 0 . In the case of the US the 
gap is part icularly dramat ic with projected growth in 2 0 0 2 
of 2.5 percent compared with rates before the s lowdown in 
the range of 4 to 5 percent. 
There is less uniformity in the projections for unemploy-
ment. Unemployment tends to lag behind downturns in the 
economic cycle, as f i rms are init ially re luctant to lay of f 
staf f tha t they have spent t ime and money recrui t ing and 
t ra in ing. It is unlikely tha t these staf f can be simply re-
engaged again if demand picks up and so most f i rms prefer 
to hoard excess labour in the shor t te rm. The rise in US 
unemployment forecast in Table 1 in 2 0 0 1 and 2 0 0 2 
despi te the projected recovery in output in 2 0 0 1 f i ts in with 
this pat tern. In contrast Euro zone unemployment is 
projected to fal l in 2 0 0 1 and 2 0 0 1 , partly as a result of the 
far milder downturn expected in Europe and new social 
legislat ion in some major European economies. 
Exchange rates and commodity prices 
The continuing strength of the Dollar despite the cuts in US 
interest rates is both surprising and also a matter for some 
concern. Conventional economic theory predicts that cuts 
in US interest rates ought to have lowered the rate of return 
on holding the Dollar resulting in a movement into other 
currencies. In turn this should have led to a weakening of 
the US Dollar relative to other currencies. Instead the Dollar 
has actually strengthened during 2001, particularly during 
February and March. The flip side of the Dollar's current 
strength is the corresponding weakness of the Euro. In 
contrast the Yen has weakened against the Dollar as 
Japanese monetary policy has been further relaxed in 
recent months. 
It is difficult to attach numbers to the impact of the Dollar's 
strength and the Euro's weakness that take full account of 
the wider impacts of exchange rates. However, it is un-
doubtedly the case that the strength of the expected 
recovery in the US economy starting in late 2001 will be 
impeded if the Dollar maintains its strength. US exports will 
be more expensive on international markets, or if their 
price is reduced then margins will be reduced and the 
incentive to export will be reduced. At the same time 
imports into the US become more competitive leading US 
residents to switch their demand away from domestic 
producers. Mirror images of these effects work to boost 
activity within the Euro zone where the exchange rate 
remains weak. 
Table 1: Forecasts of main world economy indicators 
% Growth in real GDP 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Unemployment rate 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
US 
Japan 
Euro zone 
Germany 
France 
Advanced economies 
US 
Japan 
Euro zone 
Germany 
France 
Advanced economies 
4.2 
0.8 
2.6 
1.6 
3.2 
3.4 
1999 : 
2.2 
-0.3 
1.2 
0.7 
0.6 
1.4 
5.0 
1.7 
3.4 
3.0 
3.2 
4.1 
J 
2000 
3.4 
-0.6 
2.4 
2.1 
1.8 
2.3 
1.5 
0.6 
2.4 
1.9 
2.6 
1.9 
2.5 
1.5 
2.8 
2.6 
2.6 
2.7 
'nflation rate 
2001 : 
2.6 
-0.7 
2.3 
2.0 
1.5 
2.1 
2002 
2.2 
0.4 
1.7 
1.3 
1.4 
1.8 
4.2 
4.7 
9.9 
8.3 
11.3 
6.4 
4.0 
4.7 
9.0 
7.8 
9.7 
5.9 
4.4 5.0 
5.3 5.2 
8.4 8.1 
7.6 7.4 
8.8 8.2 
5.9 5.9 
Short term interest rate 
1999 . 
5.0 
0.1 
2.7 
2.7 
2.7 
n/a 
2000 
6.3 
0.1 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
n/a 
2001 2002 
5.7 n/a 
0.2 n/a 
4.8 n/a 
4.8 n/a 
4.8 n/a 
n/a n/a 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, May 2001; Advanced economies follow IMF definition; inflation is calculated 
using consumer prices 
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Most commentators take the view that the US reacts to 
exchange rates movements more quickly than other 
economies and in particular the principal Euro economies. 
If this is the case then the recent movements in exchange 
rates will not just simply redistribute world trade between 
the US and the Euro zone. There may be a net short run 
reduction in total trade as the US balance of trade deterio-
rates more quickly than the Euro zone balance of trade 
improves. In turn this will retard global growth and the 
recovery in late 2001 and 2002. 
In our last Commentary we highlighted concerns about the 
potential impact of high oil prices upon the world economy. 
Oil prices had risen from a low of $11 a barrel to a peak of 
$25 in 1999 mainly as a result of OPEC production restric-
tions against the background of a strong world demand for 
oil driven by growth in the US and elsewhere. During 2000 
oil prices had peaked at $35 and although they had fallen 
back by the year-end there was a concern that further OPEC 
restrictions could push prices up again adding to the 
negative prospects for the world economy. A by-product of 
the slowing world economy in 2001 has been the easing of 
these concerns. The ability of OPEC to restrict supplies and 
push oil prices upwards is reduced as world demand 
moderates and commentators are expecting a price of 
around US$ 25 in 2001 and US$ 22.50 in 2002, compared 
with an average price of US$ 28.1 in 2000. Nevertheless, 
there are still some concerns about the potential short-run 
volatility of oil prices if OPEC does attempt to impose 
production controls. 
United States 
The US economy started to slowdown significantly in the 
third quarter of 2000 when real GDP growth fell to an 
annualised rate of 2.2 percent from annualised rates of 4.8 
and 5.6 percent in 2000 Q l and 2000 Q2 respectively. The 
fourth quarter annualised growth rate was even lower at 1 
percent. The latest GDP data is more encouraging with the 
advance estimate for 2001 Q l showing an annualised 
growth in GDP of 2 percent. Although most commentators 
were encouraged by this estimate it is based on incomplete 
sources and is liable to be revised in future months when 
the preliminary and final estimates are published. Using 
previous revisions to advance estimates the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis believes the current estimate is unlikely 
to be revised below 1.4 percent or above 2.9 percent. 
The projections for US GDP shown in Table 1 were released 
a day before the publication of the 2001 Q l advance GDP 
data and so may be slightly less optimistic than current 
sentiment. They are, however, in line with recent forecasts 
for 2001 published by the OECD and the National Institute 
for Economic Research. There is an expectation that the US 
economy will recover during 2002 although the forecasts 
for growth are more dispersed ranging from 2.3 to 3.1 
percent. It seems highly unlikely though that the US 
economy will return to the annual growth rates of four and 
five percent seen in the late 1990s and in 2000. The 
National Institute's medium range forecast projects an 
average annual growth of 2.8 percent for the five years 
2003 to 2007. 
We have already touched on several of the downside risks 
for the US economy over the next two years. These include: 
-> The continuing strength of the US Dollar and the 
negative effects on US trade; 
-> Further deterioration in the financial position of the 
personal and corporate sectors leading to cuts in their 
spending as they try to re-balance their balance sheets; 
and 
-> The uncertainties facing the US technology sector. 
Several leading firms in the US technology sector, including 
Cisco and Motorola, have issued profit warnings in recent 
months. The sector faces adjustment problems from the 
position where it has geared itself up to be capable of 
meeting phenomenal growth in demand for its products to 
coping with much lower growth, or even falls in demand. 
Over the year to 2001 Q l output of high technology prod-
ucts grew by nearly 37% in the US. We have already seen 
severe cut backs in investment in IT equipment and 
software where annualised growth fell off from 20.6 and 
17.9 percent in 2000 Q l and Q2 to 5.6 and -3.3 percent in 
Q3 and Q4. The advance estimate for 2001 Q l is also 
weak, showing a further fall of 2.2 percent. 
On the upside both monetary and fiscal policy are now 
reinforcing each other with the Federal Reserve having 
reduced interest rates by a full two percentage points 
already this year and President Bush's tax cuts working 
their way through the political process. Although only part 
of the tax cuts programme is due to be introduced in the 
new fiscal year starting in October 2001, the pre-announce-
ment of tax cuts over the next ten years mean that consum-
ers will look forward and factor these cuts into their current 
consumption decisions. 
Europe 
As the forecasts in Table 1 show the downturn in the Euro 
zone is expected to be far milder than that in the US. 
Projected growth in the Euro zone outstrips that in the US in 
both 2001 and 2002. Nevertheless the Euro zone is not 
immune to the slowdown in the world economy with GDP 
growth falling back during the course of 2000. There is also 
some evidence of deteriorating business confidence 
amongst European firms. In addition there is uncertainty 
about the extent and distribution of layoffs and even plant 
closures by US firms based in Europe. 
In a surprise move the ECES reduced its principal interest 
rate on May 10 th by 0.25 percentage points to 4.25 
percent. Until this decision the ECB had withstood interna-
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t ional pressure to cut its rates and the markets were clearly 
expect ing it to cont inue to do so in the short te rm. Init ial 
reaction suggests tha t there is now more uncertainty 
associated with ECB policy. 
In our January Commentary we pointed to two risk factors 
for Europe of a US downturn: 
-> A decl ine in European exports as US residents and 
companies reduced their spending; and 
-> The general reverses in equity markets in the US 
spreading to Europe. 
We have already noted that the Dollar has cont inued to 
st rengthen and the Euro remains relatively weak and so to 
some extent has been work ing against the f i rs t of these 
factors, as Euro zone exports appear compet i t ive relative to 
US produced goods. 
The convent ional wisdom is tha t the second of these 
factors would be less of a risk for Europe than the US given 
the relatively healthy posit ion of corporate and personal 
f inances in Europe and the relatively low proport ion of Euro 
zone wealth held as equit ies. Recent work at the IMF has, 
however, pointed to an interest ing vulnerabi l i ty of the 
European economies. Declines in market capi ta l isat ion of 
both technology and other equi t ies have a s imi lar ef fect on 
expenditure by companies and households in the US. In 
Europe a decl ine in market capi tal isat ion of equit ies other 
than technology stocks reduces spending by about a f i f th of 
the US and UK f igure. However, decl ines in European 
technology stocks have a simi lar effect to declines in the 
US. Despite th is the capi tal isat ion of technology is small 
relat ive to all equi t ies and so the aggregate effect of 
decl ines in European markets is sti l l about a f i f th of the 
size of US and UK reverses. 
Japan 
The immediate prospects for the Japanese economy in 
2 0 0 1 look relatively weak. In 2 0 0 0 there was some evi-
dence of a modest recovery, part icularly in industrial 
product ion and internat ional t rade in the second half of the 
year. It now appears tha t sluggish consumer spending and 
record unemployment , coupled with fal ls in equity markets 
and poor business conf idence have all contr ibuted to a 
poor out look for 2 0 0 1 . Table 1 above shows that the IMF 
projects sl ightly stronger growth in 2 0 0 2 . This is consistent 
with the recent polit ical changes in Japan and the effective 
adopt ion of a target for price stabil i ty tha t should encour-
age people to spend rather than hoard cash. Linked to the 
new price target is a commi tment to hold interest rates at 
zero for as long as required. Although the reduction in 
interest rates is marginal when measured in basis points, 
the underlying change in monetary arrangements does 
represent an easing of monetary policy in Japan. 
John Ireland 
11 th May 2 0 0 1 
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